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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a consolidated jury trial covering two cases, the jury convicted
Brandon Briggs of multiple sex crimes against minors.  In this consolidated appeal,
Mr. Briggs asserts the district court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses
by preventing him from cross-examining the alleged victims on statements they made to
him about their sexual contact with other adults and minors.  The district court’s violation
of his constitutional right to confront witnesses constituted fundamental error.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Madison County No. CR 2014-2665 (hereinafter, the 2014 case), the State
charged Mr. Briggs by Prosecuting Attorney Information with one count of lewd conduct
with a child under the age of sixteen years, felony, I.C. §§ 18-1508 and 18-112A,
against D.S.; one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years,
felony, I.C. §§ 18-1506 and 18-112A, against J.S.; one count of lewd conduct, against
J.M.; one count of lewd conduct, against D.S., for conduct in Bonneville County; one
count of lewd conduct, against D.S., for conduct in Clark County; and one count of lewd
conduct, against D.S., for conduct in Fremont County.  (R., pp.56-59.)1
Later, in Madison County No. CR 2015-2713 (hereinafter, the 2015 case), the
State charged Mr. Briggs by Prosecuting Attorney Information with three counts of
sexual abuse, against D.S.; and one count of enticing a child through the use of the
Internet or other communication device, felony, I.C. §§ 18-1509A, against D.S..
1 All citations to “R.” refer to the 446-page PDF electronic version of the Consolidated
Clerk’s Record on Appeal.
2(R., pp.334-36.)  The district court consolidated the cases for trial.  (R., pp.261-62, 390-
91.)
Meanwhile, Mr. Briggs filed a Motion in Limine, under Idaho Rule of Evidence
412, requesting the district court allow certain parts of the alleged victims’ sexual
history.  (R., pp.155-57.)  Specifically, Mr. Briggs asserted he would testify that D.S. and
J.S. told him they had sexual contact with the adults Ben Clark, Lael Clark, and Russell
Clark, as well as J.M. and other minors, W.C., T.C., and T.C.2, at or near the time of the
allegations.2  (See R., pp.155-56.)  Mr. Briggs also asserted he would testify that J.M.
told him he had sexual contact with Lael Clark, Russell Clark, J.S., and D.S., at or near
the time of the allegations.  (See R., p.156.)  Mr. Briggs asserted he asked the alleged
victims and Ruth Clark3 “to return some personal property belonging to Brandon Briggs.
The personal property was not returned, but instead [the alleged victims] claimed [they
were] touched sexually by [Mr. Briggs].”  (See R., pp.155-56.)  Mr. Briggs asserted the
testimony was “relevant to provide a motive for [the alleged victims] to lie about sexual
contact” with him.  (See R., p.156.)
Additionally, Mr. Briggs asserted he would testify that the three alleged victims
“described events in the Ruth Clark home to include watching dirty movies together,
2 While this information was not expressly presented in the motion in limine itself, it
appears Ben Clark, Lael Clark, and Russell Clark were adults at the times relevant to
the charges (see Tr., p.288, Ls.17-20, p.488, Ls.14-22, p.498, L.24 – p.499, L.2), while
W.C., T.C., and T.C.2 were minors (see Tr., p.288, Ls.24-25, p.487, L.1 – p.488, L.13,
p.556, Ls.13-15).  The alleged victim, J.M., was identified with a name which may be
abbreviated as “J.K.” in the motion in limine.  (See R., pp.155-56.)
3 The motion in limine asserted Ruth Clark was “the mother of the Clark family members
mentioned herein.”  (R., p.157.)  Ruth Clark was the mother of Ben Clark, Lael Clark
and Russell Clark, and the grandmother of W.C., T.C. and T.C.2.  (See Tr., p.49, L.25 –
p.50, L.1, p.289, L.24 – p.290, L.1, p.488, Ls.4-22, p.506, L.13 – p.507, L.3.)
3mutual masturbation . . . and sexual intercourse.”  (See R.,  p.156.)   Mr.  Briggs  also
asserted Lael Clark would testify he had been interviewed by law enforcement and
admitted to having sexual contact with one or more of the alleged victims.  (R., p.156.)
Lael Clark would testify he had not been charged with a criminal offense.  (R., p.156.)
Further, Mr. Briggs asserted he would testify that Ruth Clark was the sheriff’s sister, she
told Mr. Briggs that if he messed with her family he would end up in jail, and she called
the police to have Mr. Briggs arrested.  (R., p.157.)
At a pretrial hearing on the motion in limine and other motions, Mr. Briggs
through counsel asserted the three alleged victims “all made statements to Brandon
Briggs of the constant sexual contact in the Ruth Clark house, with sexual activities with
Lael Clark, with [W.C.], with [T.C.], with [T.C.2], with Russell Clark, with Ben Clark, and
with [J.M.].”  (Tr., p.48, Ls.14-21.)  Defense counsel asserted he could try to cross-
examine the alleged victims on those incidents, or wait until the defense case-in-chief
and have Mr. Briggs testify on what they told him.  (See Tr., p.48, L.22 – p.49, L.2.)
Mr. Briggs’ counsel asserted, “my preference would be to be allowed to cross-
examine on this, that these boys were very sexually involved with these persons
identified in the Ruth Clark home, that Brandon Briggs asked for the return of his
personal property . . . [and] doesn’t receive the property back but instead gets a
complaint for sexual abuse. . . .   [T]his testimony is relevant to provide a motive for
these boys to lie about sexual contact with [Mr. Briggs].”  (Tr., p.49, Ls.3-13.)  Counsel
later reiterated the motion in limine dealt “with the activities in the Ruth Clark home . . .
[and] these three accusers of Brandon Briggs and their motive to fabricate their stories.”
(Tr., p.50, Ls.3-6.)
4The State asserted the testimony was inadmissible under Rule 412.  (Tr., p.50,
Ls.9-15.)  However, the State conceded D.S. “did tell the defendant that he had done
certain things with Lael Clark” and “that he’d done some things with some other young
men.”  (Tr., p.50, Ls.18-24.)
The district court asked Mr. Briggs’ counsel, “what part of Rule 412 this would
be—any of these would be allowed under.”  (Tr., p.52, Ls.12-15.)  Defense counsel
thought it would go “under Rule 412(b)(2)(D), ‘sexual behavior with parties other than
the accused which occurred at the time of the event giving rise to the sex crime
charged.’”  (Tr., p.52, Ls.16-19.)
The district court determined, “evidence that Brandon Briggs requested that the
alleged victims return some of his personal property to him would be clearly relevant
because it would give him motive.”  (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-4.)  The district court also
determined, “I think evidence that these young men knew each other and would,
therefore have an opportunity to maybe conspire or get their stories together would be
relevant evidence.”  (Tr., p.54, Ls.10-13.)
However, the district court determined “the allegations about sexual contact
between these young men and others—I don’t see how that would fit under 412 in this
particular case, because consent is not an issue in this case because these are minors.”
(Tr., p.54, Ls.13-18.)  The district court rejected Rule 412(b)(2)(D) as a basis for
admitting the requested evidence.  (See Tr., p.54, L.19 – p.55, L.5.)
The district court also determined that if Ruth Clark testified on behalf of the
State, it might be relevant to inquire on cross-examination into her relationship with the
5sheriff and her possible motive to lie.4  (See Tr., p.55, Ls.6-13, 22-25.)  The district court
thought Lael Clark’s testimony was “irrelevant.”  (Tr., p.55, Ls.14-17.)
Thus, the district court determined Mr. Briggs would not be allowed to present the
proposed testimony on the statements of D.S., J.S., and J.M. to Mr. Briggs, and the
proposed testimony by Lael Clark.  (See R., pp.265-66, 394-95.)
During the trial, D.S. and J.S. testified Russell Clark was their stepfather.  (See
Tr., p.555, Ls.17-21, p.597, Ls.12-15.)  D.S. testified he was sixteen years old at the
time  of  trial  (see Tr., p.595, Ls.8-11), J.S. testified he was thirteen (see Tr., p.553,
Ls.20-23), and J.M. testified he was fourteen (see Tr., p.343, Ls.7-12).
J.M. testified he met Mr. Briggs through a friend about three years before the
trial.  (See Tr., p.345, L.20 – p.346, L.11, p.348, L.9 – p.349, L.18.)  D.S. testified he
met Mr. Briggs through his cousin, T.C.2 (see Tr., p.597, Ls.10-13), and J.S. testified he
met Mr. Briggs through his brother, D.S., and his cousins (see Tr., p.556, Ls.5-7).
The alleged victims testified they helped Mr. Briggs gather firewood, and
performed other work around his house in Archer.  (See Tr., p.349, Ls.4-13, p.558, Ls.8-
14, p.597, L.14 – p.599, L.17.)  Mr. Briggs paid them for the work, and they also
received gifts such as alcohol, cigarettes, and snowboarding equipment from
Mr. Briggs.  (See Tr., p.354, L.18 – p.355, L.14, p.558, L.22 – p.559, L.18, p.598, Ls.17-
21, p.610, L.21 – p.611, L.13.)  They and Mr. Briggs engaged in activities like
snowboarding, swimming and camping.  (See Tr., p.371, Ls.10-23, p.560, Ls.5-12,
p.599, Ls.8-17.)
4 Ruth Clark ultimately did not testify at trial.  (See Tr., pp.4-5 (index of trial witnesses).)
6D.S. testified that on one occasion when they were swimming, Mr. Briggs kissed
him on the cheek and touched his penis through his shorts.  (Tr., p.606, L.2 – p.607,
L.21.)  He testified Mr. Briggs performed oral sex on him at Mr. Briggs’ house
(Tr., p.617, L.24 – p.618, L.13), and at other locations including Island Park, Kilgore,
and Idaho Falls (see Tr., p.631, L. – p.632, L.10).  D.S. further testified Mr. Briggs once
laid on top of him and asked to have sex with him.  (Tr., p.621, L.24 – p.623, L.8.)
D.S. also testified Mr. Briggs discussed “racing” with him, meaning they would
masturbate at the same time and whoever finished first would win.  (See Tr., p.659,
Ls.1-23.)  According to D.S., Mr. Briggs would communicate with him via text message,
Facebook or Snapchat about “racing.”  (Tr., p.660, Ls.7-16.)  He testified Mr. Briggs also
asked him for photographs of his erect penis, or his “semichub” or half-erect penis, and
instructed D.S. to place his hands on his genitals.   (See Tr., p.661, L.1 – p.662, L.12.)
D.S. testified he sent Mr. Briggs such photographs on more than one occasion.
(Tr., p.662, Ls.13-18.)   The State also presented to the jury, at length, the hundreds of
pages of Facebook messages allegedly exchanged between D.S. and Mr. Briggs.  (See
generally Tr., pp.684-730.)
D.S. and J.S. testified that J.S. once walked in on Mr. Briggs performing oral sex
on D.S. at Mr. Briggs’ house.  (Tr., p.570, L.1 – p.571, L.5, p.626, Ls.16-20.)  J.S. also
testified Mr. Briggs asked to perform oral sex on him about fifteen times.  (See
Tr., p.565, Ls.2-21.)  He testified he sent Mr. Briggs a photograph of his penis via
Snapchat.  (Tr., p.572, Ls.8-25.)  Further, J.S. testified Mr. Briggs told him he performed
oral sex on J.S. at J.S.’s father’s house, while J.S. was sleeping.  (Tr., p.574, Ls.5-12.)
7J.M. testified Mr. Briggs had tried repeatedly to make a deal with him to “lay there
for ten minutes and don’t move.”  (Tr., p.358, L.8 – p.359, L.6.)  According to J.M., one
day at Mr. Briggs’ house, Mr. Briggs pushed him onto a bed, pulled down his pants, and
performed oral sex on him.  (Tr., p.360, Ls.4-17, p.363, L.14 – p.364, L.23.)   J.M.
testified Mr. Briggs later performed oral sex on him a second time.  (Tr., p.368, L.16 –
p.369, L.7.)  He testified Mr. Briggs, after the second incident, touched him more than
twenty times.  (Tr., p.370, Ls.7-22.)
Mr. Briggs testified he had been employed as a PSR (psychosocial rehabilitation
specialist).  (Tr., p.848, Ls.3-9.)  He had not provided PSR services to the alleged
victims, but rather met them through his logging business.  (See Tr., p.865, Ls.10-19.)
Mr. Briggs denied the allegations of sexual contact with J.M.  (See Tr., p.873,
Ls.2-15.)  He also denied the allegations regarding his asking to touch J.S.’s penis and
having J.S. catch him performing oral sex on D.S.  (See Tr., p.901, L.18 – p.902, L.7,
p.903, Ls.2-18.)  Further, Mr. Briggs denied kissing D.S. and touching his penis while
swimming.  (Tr., p.905, L.23 – p.906, L.4, p.908, Ls.12-20.)   He additionally denied
having sexual contact with D.S. in Island Park (see Tr., p.912, Ls.2-4), in Kilgore (see
Tr., p.915, Ls.8-12), or in Idaho Falls (see Tr., p.915, L.19 – p.916, L.14).  Mr. Briggs
testified D.S. never sent him any nude photographs.  (Tr., p.922, Ls.19-20.)   He denied
laying on top of D.S. or asking him about anal sex.  (See Tr., p.938, Ls.20-25.)
When defense counsel asked Mr. Briggs about what happened at the end of his
friendship with D.S., the State objected and asked for a sidebar.  (Tr., p.926, L.20 –
p.927, L.2.)  Outside the presence of the jury, the district court observed the State
objected because it felt the question “is now opening the door, where there’s going to be
8some . . . probably nonresponsive answers that are going to get into other sexual
conduct by one or more of the victims.  And I’ve already ruled that that’s not allowed in
the case.”  (Tr., p.927, L.15 – p.928, L.2.)  Mr. Briggs’ counsel asserted, “I think when
someone is accused of a sex crime, as Mr. Briggs is, they’re entitled to say why
someone is saying false things about them.”  (Tr., p.928, Ls.3-6.)  The district court
ultimately determined Mr. Briggs would not be allowed to answer the question.
(Tr., p.935, Ls.4-8.)
In both cases, the jury found Mr. Briggs guilty on all counts.  (Tr., p.987, L.10 –
p.990, L.2.)  In the 2014 case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of forty-eight
years, with eighteen years fixed, on each of the five lewd conduct counts, and a unified
sentence of thirty-two years, with twelve years fixed, on the sexual abuse count.
(R., pp.275-76; Tr., p.1032, L.21 – p.1033, L.18.)  In the 2015 case, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of thirty-two years, with twelve years fixed, on each of the
three sexual abuse counts,5 and a unified sentence of fifteen years, with seven years
fixed, on the enticing a child count.  (R., p.411; Tr., p.1033, L.19 – p.1034, L.13.)  The
sentences were to run concurrently.  (R., pp.276, 411.)
Mr. Briggs, in both cases, filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s
Judgment of Conviction.  (R., pp.287-89, 422-24.)  The Idaho Supreme Court ordered
the consolidation of the appeals for all purposes.  (R., p.300.)
5 The written Judgment of Conviction instead states the district court imposed a unified
sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, on each of the sexual abuse
counts.  (See R., pp.275-76, 411.)  The maximum unified sentence for sexual abuse of
a child under the age of sixteen years is twenty-five years.  I.C. § 18-1506(5).  However,
to date, Mr. Briggs has not filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion with the district
court to correct any possibly illegal sentences in these cases.
9ISSUE
Did the district court violate Mr. Briggs’ constitutional right to confront witnesses by
preventing him from cross-examining the alleged victims on statements they made to
him about their sexual contact with the persons identified in the Ruth Clark home?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Briggs’ Constitutional Right To Confront Witnesses By
Preventing Him From Cross-Examining The Alleged Victims On Statements They Made
To Him About Their Sexual Contact With Persons Identified In The Ruth Clark Home
A. Introduction
Mr. Briggs asserts the district court violated his constitutional right to confront
witnesses by preventing him from cross-examining the alleged victims on statements
they made to him about their sexual contact with the persons identified in the Ruth Clark
home.  Prior to trial, Mr. Briggs’s counsel asserted the evidence at issue was admissible
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 to show the alleged victims’ motive to lie.  (See
generally Tr., pp.48-55.)  However, defense counsel did not articulate that the evidence
was constitutionally required to be admitted pursuant to Rule 412(b)(1).  Because this
error plainly exists and is not harmless, Mr. Briggs asserts the district court’s violation of
his constitutional right to confront witnesses constitutes fundamental error and may be
reviewed by this Court.
B. Standard Of Review
This Court may review un-objected to errors under Idaho’s fundamental error
doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).  In fundamental error review, the
appellant has the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitution rights; (2) plainly
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision);
and (3) was not harmless.” Id.
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C. Preventing The Cross-Examination Of The Alleged Victims On The Statements
Violated Mr. Briggs’ Constitutional Right To Confront The Witnesses Against Him
For the first part of the fundamental error inquiry, Mr. Briggs asserts the district
court, when it prevented him from cross-examining the alleged victims on the
statements they made to him about their sexual contact with the persons identified in
the Ruth Clark home, violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
him.  The Idaho Rules of Evidence generally prohibit the admission of evidence of an
alleged victim’s past sexual behavior in criminal cases involving sex crimes.  I.R.E.
412(a) & (b).  However, evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior, other than
reputation or opinion evidence, is admissible if such evidence meets one of the narrow
exceptions in I.R.E. 412(b).  One of those exceptions is for evidence that is admitted in
accordance with the motion practice provisions of Rule 412(c) and “is constitutionally
required to be admitted.”  I.R.E. 412(b)(1).
Mr. Briggs asserts the proposed testimony that would have been elicited through
cross-examination was constitutionally required to be admitted under his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him.  The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  This guarantee is made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he United States Supreme Court
has recognized the importance of effective cross-examination in securing this right.”
State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 91 (1993) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
As the Araiza Court discussed, the United States Supreme Court in Davis “held that the
Sixth Amendment allows a defendant to inquire on cross-examination into potential bias
12
or motive of a witness.” Id.  The Araiza Court continued:  “Davis held that in order to
give meaning to the right to confront witnesses, the defendant must be permitted to do
more than merely ask whether a witness is biased, but must be allowed to show why
the witness might be biased by presenting the facts necessary to allow the jurors to
form inferences regarding the witness’ impartiality.” Id. (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 319).
Further, the United States Supreme Court in Davis “recognized that the bias,
prejudice, or motive of a witness to lie concerning issues presented in a trial is always
material and relevant to effective cross-examination.” Id. (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 316).
In the words of the Davis Court, “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a
proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17.
The United States Supreme Court later held, “trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive
or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see
Araiza, 124 Idaho at 91.  The Confrontation Clause “guarantees an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Araiza, 124 Idaho at 91.6
6 More recently, the United States Supreme Court has indicated the Confrontation
Clause does not guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to introduce extrinsic evidence
for impeachment purposes. See Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S.Ct. 1990 (2013)
(per curiam).
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Here, the district court deprived Mr. Briggs of the opportunity for effective cross-
examination by preventing him from cross-examining the alleged victims on the
statements.  The district court prohibited all inquiry, through cross-examination of the
alleged victims, into the possibility that the alleged victims had a motive to lie as a result
of their desire to cover up sexual contact going on between the alleged victims and the
persons identified in the Ruth Clark home.  That decision came even after the State
conceded one of the alleged victims, D.S., had made statements to Mr. Briggs about
doing “certain things” with one of the identified adults, the brother of his stepfather.
(See Tr., p.50, Ls.20-23.)  Like in Van Arsdall, “[b]y thus cutting off all questioning about
an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably have
found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the
court’s ruling violated [Mr. Briggs’] rights secured by the Confrontation Clause.” See
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
This case also presents parallels with Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988)
(per curiam).  In Olden, the petitioner in a forcible sodomy case sought to introduce
evidence the alleged victim was currently living with her boyfriend. Olden, 488 U.S. at
229-30.   The petitioner and his friend had dropped off the alleged victim in front of her
boyfriend’s house; while the alleged victim told her boyfriend she had been raped, the
petitioner and his friend testified the petitioner had consensual sex with the alleged
victim. Id. at 228-29.  The alleged victim was apparently in an extramarital relationship
with her boyfriend. Id. at 229.  The petitioner’s theory of the case was that the alleged
victim concocted her story about being raped by the petitioner to protect her relationship
with her boyfriend, who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her leave the friend’s
14
car. Id. at 229-30.  The petitioner asserted the cohabitation evidence was crucial to
demonstrating the alleged victim’s motive to lie. Id. at 230.
The district court granted the prosecutor's motion in limine to keep all evidence of
the alleged victim’s and boyfriend’s living arrangements from the jury. Id.  The jury
convicted the petitioner, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. Id.
at 230-31.  The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment. Id. at 233.  The
Olden Court noted “petitioner has consistently asserted that he and [the alleged victim]
engaged in consensual sexual acts and that [the alleged victim]—out of fear of
jeopardizing her relationship with [her boyfriend]—lied when she told [her boyfriend] she
had been raped and has continued to lie since.” Id. at 232.  The Olden Court then held,
“[i]t is plain to see that ‘[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different
impression of [the witness’] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue
his proposed line of cross-examination.’” Id. (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680).
The Olden Court also found it “impossible to conclude ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that
the restriction on petitioner’s right to confrontation was harmless.” Id. at 233.
Similar to the petitioner in Olden, Mr. Briggs here has asserted that the alleged
victims lied when they reported sexual contact with him.  It may be argued the lies were
born out of the alleged victims’ fear of jeopardizing their relationships with the stepfather
of D.S. and J.S., and with the other identified persons in the Ruth Clark home. See
Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.  In view of the proposed testimony that would have been
elicited through cross-examination of the alleged victims, it is plain to see that a
reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the alleged
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victims’ credibility had Mr. Briggs been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-
examination. See Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.
In sum, the district court, by precluding Mr. Briggs from exposing the alleged
victims’ motive to lie, deprived Mr. Briggs of the opportunity for effective cross-
examination.  Thus, the district court violated Mr. Briggs’ constitutional right to confront
the witnesses against him when it prevented him from cross-examining the alleged
victims on the statements.
D. The Error Plainly Exists
Mr. Briggs next asserts the district court’s error in violating his constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against him plainly exists. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
Defense counsel made efforts to show the alleged victims’ motive to lie, both prior to
and during the trial.  (See generally Tr., pp.48-55, 928-35.)  Thus, there does not appear
to be any reason to believe defense counsel made a tactical decision to seek to offer
the testimony that would have been elicited through cross-examination without asserting
the proper basis for admitting it—as constitutionally required to be admitted.
Additionally, the record does not indicate Mr. Briggs’ counsel was “sandbagging” the
issue, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 224; counsel did attempt to have the alleged victims
cross-examined to show their motive to lie, and even expressed his preference to cross-
examine them.  (See Tr., p.48, L.22 – p.49, L.13.)  Further, as examined above in
Section C., the law on the right to confrontation, the importance of effective cross-
examination to that right, and the relevance of witnesses’ motive to lie, is clear.  Thus,
the district court’s error is plain on its face.
16
E. The Error Was Not Harmless
Because Mr. Briggs did not assert before the district court the alleged victims’
testimony through cross-examination on the statements was constitutionally required to
be admitted, he bears “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the
error affected the outcome of the trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  Mr. Briggs submits
there is a reasonable possibility that the error in this case affected the outcome of his
trial.  The credibility of the alleged victims was critical to the State’s case against
Mr. Briggs.  In closing argument, apart from the copious amounts of Facebook
messages (see, e.g., Tr., p.969, L.23 – p.970, L.1, p.974, Ls.5-10), the State primarily
relied upon the testimony of the alleged victims to convince the jury of Mr. Briggs’ guilt.
(See, e.g., Tr., p.967, L.20 – p.968, L.13 (the prosecutor arguing, “[r]emember what
[D.S.] said.  He said one day he had him on the floor. . . .”), p.976, Ls.3-8 (the
prosecutor arguing, “you’ve heard the testimony from the kids.  You’ve seen them face-
to-face.  You’ve seen how they testify.  When you put this together with the Facebook
communications, it’s all there. . . .”).)
Mr. Briggs’ counsel, in closing, framed the case as “about credibility.”  (Tr., p.976,
Ls.12-13.)  Defense counsel also asserted there was a lack of DNA evidence,
photographs, and even eyewitnesses.  (See Tr., p.976, Ls.17-22.)  Mr. Briggs’ counsel
asked the jury, “[w]ho do we believe?  Brandon Briggs, an educated PSR worker, or
troubled kids, trying to shift the blame?  Who do you believe?”  (Tr., p.977, Ls.7-9.)
Considering the importance of the alleged victims’ testimony—and thus, their
credibility—the jury’s assessment of their stories would likely have been swayed by
cross-examination showing they had a possible motive to lie. See Olden, 488 U.S. at
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232; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. There is therefore a reasonable probability that the
error affected the outcome of the trial.  Thus, the district court’s violation of Mr. Briggs’
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him constitutes fundamental error.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  This fundamental error requires remand.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Briggs respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgments of conviction in both cases and remand the cases to the district court for a
new trial.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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